John Jones KC has over 40 years’ experience at the Bar, 22 of which have been in Silk.

He is widely acknowledged as a ‘go-to’ advocate for major heavyweight criminal cases and is recommended year after year in Chambers and Partners and the Legal 500, where he is described as a “superb jury advocate”.

John is currently ranked for Financial Crime and Crime in Chambers and Partners, and ranked Tier 1 for Crime and also ranked for Business and Regulatory Crime including Health and Safety in The Legal 500.

In recent years, John has focused his criminal practice on defence work, covering all areas of serious crime including murder, manslaughter, historic sex abuse, drugs and terrorism related offences.

Working with a wide-range of instructing solicitors, John has an outstanding track record – last year alone he secured two high-profile murder acquittals.

Acting on behalf of defendant Anthony Sladek, 39, at Leeds Crown Court, John successfully put forward the “householder defence” – enacted by section 76(5A) and (8A) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 – for his client who was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter due to his part in the alleged attack. Others on trial were convicted of murder. This was a complex case both factually and legally in consequence of the interaction of self-defence and the householder defence which were to be assessed by the jury.

The Sladek acquittal followed on from John securing an acquittal for his client in a murder trial at Liverpool Crown Court. Joseph Byrne was accused of murdering Christopher Molloy during an attack. The prosecution’s case was that Mr Molloy was murdered to “teach him a lesson” after he was alleged to have accosted young girls on a street in Liverpool at night. The defendant struck the deceased twice but upon falling, the deceased struck his head on the pavement. After the defendant left the scene, two others including his brother and a 16-year-old boy came and kicked the unconscious man. The cause of death and sequencing of the blows was critical. The defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter but the prosecution refused to accept the plea. He was found not guilty of murder following John’s submissions to the jury.

From the foundations of a successful criminal practice, John has also developed a strong professional disciplinary and regulatory practice, with particular expertise in health and safety and environmental work.

An incisive advocate known for his formidable ability in the courtroom, John is equally at home with detailed cross examination as he is in ensuring the jury fully understands with complete clarity, the issue he is raising. He is a calm, yet persuasive presence who, through years of heavyweight, hard-hitting advocacy is widely respected by opponents, juries and judges alike.

David Illingworth, Pupil Barrister

The decision of Ritchie J in Williams-Henry v Associated British Ports Holdings Ltd [2024] EWHC 806 gives, for the first time, judicial guidance on how the courts will apply the “substantial injustice” exception to the statutory rules on fundamental dishonesty. The case is also of interest for its clarification of when and how defendants should plead fundamental dishonesty.

Substantial injustice

As Ritchie J noted in his judgment, there has to date been no case which has defined the meaning of substantial injustice. It has generally been assumed that judges will “know it when they see it”: Woodger v Hallas [2022] EWHC 1561 (QB), at [49].

In this case, having decided that the claimant had been fundamentally dishonest, Ritchie J went back to first principles. His starting point was that a dishonest claimant is not suffering an injustice per se by being deprived of his/her genuine damages.  But the consequences of that dismissal did need to form part of the analysis:

“In my judgment it is the dismissal of the claim for damages that is the trigger for the analysis of whether a substantial injustice will occur if no damages are awarded. One cannot ignore the very thing which S.57(3) takes away when considering the injustice of the taking away.”

Ritchie J then set out, at [178], a non-exhaustive list of factors the courts should consider when deciding whether dismissing a claim would cause substantial injustice:

(1) The amount claimed versus the amount of assessed genuine damages: the greater the difference, the more weight this factor will have.

(2) The scope and depth of that dishonesty found to have been deployed by the claimant. Ritchie J held that “widespread and gross dishonesty” would weigh more heavily against a finding of substantial injustice than “moderate or minor dishonesty”. Of course, at this stage of the analysis, the court has already decided that the dishonesty is “fundamental”.

(3) The effect of the dishonesty on the claim, including costs consequences.

(4) The scope and level of the claimant’s assessed genuine disability caused by the defendant. Ritchie J focused here, not on the claimant’s long-term suffering, but on the injustice of taxpayers ultimately bearing the cost of NHS treatment of a dishonest claimant who has not recovered damages.

(5) The nature and culpability of the defendant’s tort.

(6) The costs consequences if the claim is not dismissed. If the court finds substantial injustice but the genuine damages to be received by the claimant would “be substantially reduced or eradicated by the adverse costs awards, then it is less likely that [substantial injustice] will be caused by the dismissal.”

(7) Whether the defendant has made interim payments, how large are these and whether the claimant be able to afford to pay them back.

(8) The  effect which dismissing the claim have on the claimant’s life: “will she lose her house? Will she have to live on benefits, being unable to work?”

Having applied these factors, Ritchie J concluded that requiring the claimant to repay £75,000 of interim payments could, when combined with dismissal of the claim, lead to injustice. However, the defendant had decided not to apply for an order for repayment of interim payments, pointing out that the court could refuse to make such an order under CPR Part 25. The interim payments having been thus disposed of, the court held that there would not be substantial injustice caused by dismissing the claim:

“I know it looks like a large sum of money to deprive a genuinely injured person of, but by drafting and passing S.57 Parliament sought to stamp out dishonesty which is fundamental in personal injury claims and the Claimant has breached this law.”

When fundamental dishonesty should be pleaded

Practitioners will be very familiar with Cojanu v Essex [2002] EWHC 197 (QB), a previous decision of Ritchie J which is often used to argue that defendants have raised allegations of fundamental dishonesty too late to be considered by the trial judge.

In this case, Ritchie J clarified his statement in Cojanu that “the section 57 defence should be pleaded”:

“I should clarify that I used “should” not “must” in the pleading ruling. Subsequent authorities have polished the pleading point. S.57 can be raised late in the day, even if there is no pleading, if it has reasonably only arisen late.”

It is submitted that the operative word in this statement is “reasonably”. Defendants do not have carte blanche to ambush claimants with fundamental dishonesty allegations at a late stage to seek a tactical advantage.

High Court, Ritchie J.

Pankaj Madan Barrister, Exchange Chambers

The Judgment in the case of Kirsty Williams-Henry makes for very uncomfortable reading for everybody who deals with severe to catastrophic personal injury cases.

On the face of it, this was not a case where ordinarily one would have expected a Claimant to have been fundamentally dishonest. The Claimant herself had worked in the insurance industry for a major respected insurer, Admiral. There had been a rehabilitation programme involving a case manager, neuropsychological and physical rehabilitation at a cost of over £80,000.

The brief facts

The judgment runs to 99 pages. It is a characteristically clear and well constructed judgment by Ritchie J. The judgment is well worth a read.

In July 2018, this Claimant, now 33 years of age, suffered a moderately-severe traumatic brain injury and other multiple injuries in a nasty fall off Aberavon Pier which was insufficiently guarded by railings. The Defendant was the owner or occupier of the pier and had admitted liability which settled at 2/3rds 1/3^rd in the Claimant’s favour.

This was essentially a moderate-severe brain injury and pain case. The claim was £3.5 million, full liability. The Counter-schedule admitted either £374,000 or £552,000 odd on a full liability basis.

She had made some recovery and indeed returned to work before the instruction of a case manager and neuropsychologist recommended that she cease work for rehabilitation. The Court found that this recommendation was iatrogenic and inappropriate and was critical of the case manager and treating neuropsychologist.

It was contended that the Claimant lost capacity largely because of her deteriorating mental health.  Indeed, she had undergone the removal of part of her frontal lobe in a cranioplasty. Unsurprisingly, she was not a good witness, but the Court found her nonetheless to be a fundamentally dishonest Claimant in the light of contrasting DWP records, personnel records, social media depictions, extensive video-surveillance and a life insurance application form arising after the accident.

The Judgment

The Court found the Claimant had been dishonest. She was severely depressed by the time of trial but this was largely as a result of her own dishonesty, the allegations of dishonesty made, and the impending trial and as such was largely her own fault.

Ritchie J assessed the genuine element of her damages claim as £895,000 on a full liability basis. The Court deprived her of all of her damages due to her fundamental dishonesty but allowed her not to repay interim payments of £75,000.

Key findings

The Court found that the reported problems to the case manager, which were extensive by late March 2022, were largely fabricated and that there had been a taking of the Claimant’s assertions at face value.

The case manager had failed to read or was not given the relevant neurorehabilitation and other treatment notes, and had a lack of understanding and “sloppiness” and a blinkered approach.  This set in train some adverse consequences for the Claimant. She would stop work in 6 months, disengage from all NHS treatment and fall into a suicidal state of despair.

The advice to give up work was truly catastrophic for her state of mind, the Court found.

The Claimant had misled the Court and experts (and no doubt her skilled legal team). Key points were: –

• She had exaggerated the effects of the injuries in her DWP claim for benefits. Whilst much of that was collateral, it gave the impression of a Claimant willing to lie for financial gain.
• She had lied on a life application form. She knew, coming from an insurance company, above all how this was unlawful. Whilst collateral to the claim it gave a very poor impression of the Claimant.
• She had grossly exaggerated the effects of her injuries to medical experts, for example a major intolerance to heat (seen going about on holidays in warm climates), eating the same meals every day and not being able to eat curry anymore (seen out for curries on social media posts),
• Showering at home without help, when saying she needed to shower at her mother’s house under supervision due to dizziness,
• Noise intolerance in large crowds, yet going to a “Spice Girls” Concert.
• Not drinking alcohol due to her TBI but seen doing so in various social media posts.
• Struggling at work and with multi-tasking, contradicted by work appraisals – some self-performed – and performance reviews.
• Failed to disclose holidays abroad, spa trips, attendance at weddings, hen visits, rock and pop concert attendances.
• New assertions made in the claim, such as light reflecting off water disorientated her, were false.
• A spa weekend where she was seen walking up the hill with no limp and no stick, having driven her friends there.
• When the successful application for social media was made, this showed undisclosed holidays, spa weekends, cinema trips, pop concerts, weddings, hen nights, drinking, partying – yet she failed to tell clinicians, medico-legal experts and her lawyers; creating a false impression of extensive disability for financial gain.

“Lie by lie, the answers were exposed by professional and careful cross examination….”

The Court found that she had: –

“Provided the breathtakingly dishonest answer in cross examination that there is nothing she would take back which was written in the DWP forms”.

“Overall, I regret to say that I found the Claimant to be dishonest and manipulative both in Court and in what she said to the medico-legal experts.”

A number of the claimant’s experts, case manager and treating experts didn’t come out of the claim too well.

Learning from the case

What can practitioners, and experts, whether Claimant or Defendant, take away from the case.  Here is my 23-point guide: –

1. Don’t assume that because the Claimant suffered a very serious injury that there cannot be serious dishonesty and that this cannot be found to be fundamental.
2. Don’t assume that collateral dishonesty in applications especially for insurance or benefits will be forgiven or attributed to the injury. Brain Injury or depression should not cause dishonesty. Collateral dishonesty is highly relevant to the impression the Court will form of a Claimant.
3. Ensure that the case manager preparing an INA does not take self-assertions at face value.
4. Ensure that the case manager and neuropsychologist have read the treatment notes or go back to those when they are available and see if they support their initial conclusions even if they didn’t have the notes when they made the INA.
5. Even in a serious injury case, you cannot ignore social media. Claimant lawyers should ask to look at it once an initial record of the Claimant’s symptoms and condition have been taken. Keep it under review.
6. Social media is potentially disclosable and must be preserved. Defendant lawyers should be considering applications for disclosure. In this case as this was post-surveillance, it was unanswerable.
7. Ensure treating and medical experts do not lose objectivity or neutrality and do not take the Claimant just at face value. A good rule of thumb is to remember if you can’t prove your claim without the Claimant’s evidence, then you may not have a good claim.
8. Don’t assume that failed performance validity testing on neuropsychological testing can always be explained or falls away. It is a relevant factor and should cause you to test the evidence in more detail.
9. Experts should not countersign a litigation capacity report (or anything) if they have not carried out testing of the Claimant themselves.
10. If surveillance is disclosed, Claimant lawyers must ensure that all their experts have seen the videos and social media.
11. Experts should be able to explain logically the assertions they make e.g. “a 2-year acceleration”. If you cannot, don’t make it. Use literature when appropriate.
12. Experts should not ignore advising on which complaints are caused by the tort and which are not. An attempt should always be made even if it is difficult to do so. The duty is to help the Court.
13. Experts should not be too accepting of self-reported information. They must adequately cross-reference it with contradictory medical notes, video evidence, social medial, employment and personnel documentation and consider the contradictions with sufficient objectivity.
14. A new explanation in this case “Functional Neurological Disorder” made at trial by an expert is unlikely to hold water. Avoid off the cuff opinions post-joint report.
15. Ensure experts are instructed to consider surveillance and social media evidence in a supplemental report not just when coming to the joint report.
16. Experts must not step outside their field of expertise. Neuropsychologists on both sides stepped outside their field into areas which were the province of the neuropsychiatrist.
17. Whether expert or lawyer, think very carefully before ever advising any claimant who is working to stop work. This always must be a carefully managed decision and one taken by the Claimant themselves. Work is often beneficial to the state of mind and recovery.
18. Examine experts’ CVs in conference and ensure they are up to date and accurate. One of the Claimant’s experts was challenged for example on their split of work. They said it was 60% claimant, when under expert cross examination it appeared to be more like 90%! This didn’t help.
19. Be mindful of the effect of the potentially iatrogenic effect of a claim itself upon claimants and whether it is doing them any good or causing proliferation of symptoms.
20. Experts should be sure about advising on the need for lifetime care and case management, particularly if there is a lack of demonstrable organic pathology caused by the TBI. This can cause further loss of self-esteem, self-confidence and ability to be independent.
21. Long winded-ness and long disseminations under cross examination from experts or any witness is unlikely to impress. Test your expert in conference and instruct experts where possible who are experienced in giving evidence in Court.

Of one of the Claimant’s experts, the Court said: –

“Watching the process of getting her to admit that [the claimant had given a worse account of her symptoms than the reality] was like watching counsel pushing a boulder up a steep hill.”

22. Firms should avoid instructing the same expert to the extent that they may become beholden to the firm for their work and face the charge that they have lost impartiality. This applies both to Claimant and Defendant firms and possibly insurers too.
23. Consider early offers to settle and mediation. Both sides on occasions demonstrate fantastic victories in this hotly contested area of litigation. I have always believed in “sensible, steady, and objective”. Even the most skilled lawyer can be caught out by a manipulative Claimant.  Although the Defendant achieved a terrific victory in this case, no doubt the costs are unlikely to be recovered and the cost of an 11 day trial will be very substantial. It is worth remembering other cases have not always proven to be so successful for the Defendant.

Substantial injustice

Ritchie J disagreed with the test laid down by Knowles J in London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games v Sinfield [2018] EWHC 51. The test is that it is the dismissal of the claim for damages that triggers the analysis of whether a substantial injustice will occur if no damages are awarded. The Court must balance the facts factors and circumstances of the case.

Here is the 8 point test.

1. The amount claimed when compared with the amount awarded.
2. The scope and depth of the dishonesty, minor, moderate or gross.
3. The effect of the dishonesty on the construction of the claim.
4. The scope and level of the Claimant’s assessed genuine disability.
5. The nature and culpability of the Defendant’s tort.
6. What the Court would do in relation to costs if the claim were not dismissed.
7. Interim payments and how the Claimant could afford to pay them back.
8. Effect on the Claimant’s life, housing, finances and ability to work.

Summary

The Court found that: –

“Had the Claimant been honest and genuine with her clinicians, the Defendant, the Court and the experts, the case would never have warranted surveillance and would probably have settled in late 2023, with a quite substantial payment and no costs penalty. In my judgment the case went to trial because of the Claimant’s dishonesty, and this led to her deepening depression”.

About the author:

Pankaj Madan is a senior Barrister specialising in Traumatic Brain Injury from the subtle to the Catastrophic and Severe pain cases. He acts for both Claimants and Defendants and practices from Exchange Chambers and 12 King’s Bench Walk. He is a member of the Royal Society of Medicine, Pain Section Council and has many years’ experience as a Deputy District Judge.  He is the author of published books about brain injury and pain.

Louis Browne KC from Exchange Chambers appeared before the First Tier Tribunal – Criminal Injuries Compensation, representing the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority and also acted as amicus curiae (“friend of the court”).

The case concerned an application made under paragraph 13 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1990 to reconsider a case involving a young woman who has substantially outlived her life expectancy.

The 1990 Scheme is a forerunner of the tariff schemes now in place. It is a non-statutory ex gratia scheme which was created under prerogative powers and designed to compensate innocent victims of crimes of violence on the basis, subject to its other provisions, of common law damages usually in the form of a lump sum payment which, again usually, is final.

The applicant was born a healthy baby in November 1994.  In March 1995 she sustained a very severe brain injury after being shaken by her natural father. As a result, she is very severely disabled with a spastic tetraplegia, severe learning difficulties, epilepsy, scoliosis, hip dislocation and multiple sequelae including apnoea episodes and bronchospasm.

The applicant was placed with foster parents who thereafter adopted her and who have provided her with care of the highest quality.

An application for criminal injuries compensation was made on the applicant’s behalf by her County Council on or about 29 March 1996. The application was finally determined at a hearing in 2010. The lump sum award was £510,084.48 net of deductible benefits of £200,685.28. After further deduction of the interim payments made by then of £330,000, the balance of the award was £180,084.48. This sum was accepted in August 2010 in full and final settlement of the claim for criminal injuries compensation.

So far as the assessment of future losses was concerned, in 2010 the Tribunal held that the applicant was unlikely to live beyond 20 years of age.

However, the applicant is now 29 years of age and has already substantially outlived her life expectancy.

Accordingly, an application was made by her adoptive mother and litigation friend, under paragraph 13 of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 1990 to reconsider the case.

Paragraph 13 of the scheme says:

“Although the Board’s decisions in a case will normally be final, they will have discretion to reconsider a case after a final award of compensation has been accepted where there has been such a serious change in the applicant’s medical condition that injustice would occur if the original assessment of compensation were allowed to stand, or where the victim has since died as a result of his injuries. A case will not be re-opened more than three years after the date of the final award unless the Board are satisfied, on the basis of evidence presented with the application for re­opening the case, that the renewed application can be considered without a need for extensive enquiries. A decision by the Chairman that a case may not be re-opened will be final.”

Comparing the applicant’s medical condition at the date of the original award in 2010 the Tribunal could find no indication that her prognosis has changed: her attributable medical condition was understood to be irreversible and permanent in 2010, as it is today.

What has changed is that the applicant has outlived the earlier assumed life expectancy, which has been re-assessed to age 36, and the reduced ability of her adoptive parents to care for her, due to their age and health conditions.

Agreeing with Louis Browne KC’s submissions, the Tribunal refused the application to reconsider the case primarily on the basis that an extended life expectancy was not a serious change in the applicant’s medical condition. They also considered, in the specific circumstances of this case, that there would be a need for extensive enquiries to enable the claim to be re-opened.

Commenting on the case, Louis Browne KC said:

“For the purpose of the 1990 scheme, the applicant had to show that there was a serious change in her medical condition in order to reopen the case.

“As a matter of law and on the facts, the Tribunal concluded that an extended life expectancy was not a serious change.”

Louis Browne KC was instructed by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority.

Imran Shafi KC was privately instructed to represent an accountant who pleaded guilty to mortgage fraud. The prosecution put the value of the fraud at just over £2 million and suggested it fell into the relevant sentencing guidelines resulting in a starting point of 7 years immediate custody. Mr Shafi KC, in written and oral submissions, convinced the Judge that the approach of the prosecution was misconceived and the correct starting point was one of 18 months immediate custody. The Judge agreed, and taking into account the mitigation, he imposed a suspended sentence.

Imran Shafi KC is widely regarded as one of the leading criminal barristers on circuit, if not nationwide. He is instructed in the most serious criminal matters and has appeared in numerous groundbreaking cases. He is renowned for his track record of having cases discontinued, dismissed and successfully applying to exclude evidence.

His instructions are increasingly private, however he does still accept instructions in serious publicly-funded work.

Julian King appears in Equality Act / Police Misconduct Case

Julian King represented a police officer accused of misusing police computer systems. PC W faced allegations of breaches of the Professional Standards of behaviour in respect of Confidentiality, Discreditable Conduct and Honesty and Integrity. He denied allegations his behaviour amounted to Gross Misconduct.

During the hearing, which commenced on the 8^th April at South Yorkshire Police, detailed arguments were advanced in respect of medical evidence. Julian made submissions in respect of the Equality Act 2010, and findings of Disability.

At the conclusion of the case, the Panel found breaches of the professional standards to be proved. However, the Officer’s behaviour was assessed to be at the level of Misconduct only. Gross Misconduct was not proved and the Officer received a written warning.

Julian was instructed by Tom Nutter, Partner and Co-Head of Crime and Regulatory at Gorvins Solicitors.

Favourable Outcome secured for Police Officer in Alcohol Misuse Case

Julian King has also appeared for a South Wales Police Officer in a recent Misconduct Hearing, convened at Bridgend. The faced allegations of consuming alcohol on duty, thereby breaching standards of ‘Fitness for Duty’ ,’Orders and Instructions’ and ‘Discreditable Conduct’. The case required submissions on the relevance of the Equality Act and the finding of a disability. Following extended submissions on mitigating circumstances, the Panel found Gross Misconduct proved and imposed a Final Written Warning as sanction.

https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/south-wales-police-detective-unblemished-28881290

Julian was instructed by Alan Ridler, Straw and Pearce Solicitors.

Julian specialises in professional discipline, regulatory and serious criminal cases. He spent 20 years working within policing before commencing practice.

He often represents police officers or other professionals facing criminal or disciplinary proceedings. He has detailed knowledge of serious crime, with specific experience within the fields of fraud and corporate crime.

Julian is appointed to the Specialist Regulatory Panel (List C).

Eddy Steele from Exchange Chambers, instructed by CPS RASSO Division, has secured guilty verdicts prosecuting two counts of sexual assault after a four-day trial at Bolton Crown Court.

The trial concerned two teenage girls who were sexually assaulted by an elder male colleague at their place of work, a gymnasium, in south Manchester.

Eddy regularly prosecutes and defends cases involving rape and serious sexual offences.  In terms of his prosecution work, he has successfully obtained convictions for serious sexual offences.

Eddy is a crime and regulatory specialist.  His year of call (2022) does not accurately reflect his time working in the legal industry (since 2009), where he used to work for one of the largest global business law firms as a nationally recognized regulatory solicitor.  Eddy was appointed a coroner in 2022 and sits at Hull Coroners Court.

He is currently instructed in a number of high-profile criminal and regulatory cases, inquest proceedings and professional disciplinary hearings.

In a liability compromise approved today by the High Court in Newcastle, David Knifton KC has secured what the Judge described as an “excellent outcome” on behalf of a child who suffered quadriplegic cerebral palsy at the time of his birth at The Royal Victoria Infirmary, Newcastle Upon Tyne, in 2014.

The child (known as AWZ under the terms of an anonymity order protecting his identity) is profoundly disabled as a result of suffering a prolonged period of intra-uterine hypoxia prior to his delivery by caesarean section. His mother had attended hospital with a suspected placental abruption, but there was a negligent delay before the midwives summoned the consultant obstetrician to review her, approximately 45 minutes after her arrival. Thereafter, despite a non-reassuring CTG, it was decided not to intervene until the fetal heart rate collapsed. Regrettably, by the time the baby was delivered, he had suffered profound hypoxic brain damage.

Although the Trust admitted a breach of duty in failing to seek earlier medical review, both breach of duty and causation were denied, upon the basis that the decision not to expedite delivery was reasonable, in the absence of clear abnormalities on the CTG trace. Moreover, the Trust’s obstetric expert contended that the acute hypoxic event had been precipitated by the artificial rupture of the membranes undertaken shortly beforehand, such that the same outcome would have followed even if the doctor had been called earlier.

Recognising that the issues were finely balanced, at a settlement meeting in January 2024, David Knifton KC carefully negotiated a compromise under which the Trust will be liable for 55% of the damages that would have been payable had the Claimant’s hypoxic brain injury been held entirely attributable to the Defendant’s negligence. As the Judge commented in approving that compromise, this represented a “very good outcome”, in circumstances where there was a significant risk that the claim would have failed at trial, with no compensation at all being recovered. As he told the Claimant’s mother: “You have been very well looked-after by your legal team”.

The parties will now co-operate in investigating the value of the claim by commissioning reports from a number of experts, in the expectation that the case will settle for a very substantial sum of damages before the quantum trial is due to be heard in late 2025.

Commenting on the settlement, David said: “It has been a privilege to represent this child and his parents. Through their tremendous dedication and care, he has made remarkable progress in overcoming the many difficulties presented by his profound disability. They now have the enormous advantage of knowing that his future will be financially secure, enabling them to plan their lives accordingly. Fortunately, the skill and experience of their legal team, together with the sensible and measured approach taken by the Trust’s lawyers, has enabled a difficult case to be compromised in a manner which undoubtedly benefits both parties.”  

David Knifton was instructed by Clair Wilson, Principal Medical Negligence Lawyer at Thompsons Solicitors