The major issue in the case involved the decision as to what was appropriate future care: as the final award was £617,000, it was obviously important that good witnesses were selected. Maggie Sargent was the Plaintiff's expert, and she was supported by Mrs Carmen Welsh, who apparently was involved in the Plaintiff's treatment and management. The Judge said: "I should add that Mr Ryland did not impress me as a witness either as to the facts of this case or as to his opinion. The whole of his approach, in my judgment, was wrong-footed by his failure to note the stress in the home. If he had noted that and noted the extent of the stress I am quite satisfied he would have come to a different view than the one he holds, which is that Mrs Doyle should be the principal carer of her daughter at home until Mrs Doyle reaches 65. I reject that view. For the avoidance of any doubt, I prefer the views, the evidence, the findings and the opinions of Mrs Sargent and Mrs Welsh on any issue as to opinion or to fact where they are at variance with Mr Ryland;....I take the view that with Julia care should now be entrusted to professionals, with an input from Mrs Doyle and her family ....This, in my judgment, is best achieved for Julia by a spell at Banstead Hall, followed by the provision of a suitable home for her with professional care readily at hand and with mother living in accommodation nearby....I base that view specifically on the evidence given by Mrs Sargent and Mrs Welsh, both of whom struck me as being impressive in what they said and what they advised, based on considerable familiarity on a factual basis with the way things are in this family at the moment." (My emphasis)....Having come so clearly to those conclusions, I hope I do not sound dismissive of the views which have been placed before me in the opposite direction. I do not discount the opinion of Dr Richardson lightly.....I still think he is taking a very narrow view of the wider issue of rehabilitation in the full sense. I prefer the outlook, the views and the attitude towards reconciliation adopted by Mrs Sargent and Mrs Welsh. I also note that they are absolutely up-to-date with what goes on at Banstead Hall and he is not. It comes as no surprise that I follow what they are saying, rather than what he says....The other witness who was against it was Mr Ryland, but that carries no weight with me at all.".

Those quoted passages highlight the importance, in substantial personal injury actions, of finding top quality, independent, fair and experienced witnesses, and nothing can demonstrate this point better than the Judge's complete dismissal of the defence care consultant. In my opinion, it really is counter-productive for defendants to select experts who minimise costs to an unacceptable extent. Not only does it offend all those who are genuinely concerned to achieve a fair result for an injured plaintiff, but also it increases costs and antagonism vastly. I think this problem is aggravated by the fact that some defendants appear to think that any plaintiff's expert who estimates that a lot of expensive care is required in the future is automatically a generic "plaintiffs' expert", always exaggerating and over-estimating. My own experience is rather the reverse, and this case is just one of a number in which plaintiffs' experts have been accepted and defendants' experts have been rejected and criticised. Of course I realise that is not the universal result, and each case is different: I would accept the point that, if a plaintiff's advisers select inappropriate experts who are being unrealistically high in their estimations of care, the reverse result ought to follow.

The next point of substantial interest is in relation to the cost of investment advice. This point was argued on the basis that Francis v Bostock (The Times 8.11.85 - discussed at paragraph 5-070/2 of Kemp & Kemp and reported at A2-102 of Kemp) is the preferable authority, to the effect that the cost of investment advice to allow a plaintiff to manage a large award of damages is too remote. However, the conflicting decision is Anderson v Davies (Bell J before his appointment, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge on 25.9.92), and His Honour Judge Young preferred that reasoning. In addition, though, he highlighted a point of distinction which might be worth considering: where a plaintiff's damages are managed by the Court of Protection, as in Julia Doyle's case, she has no choice whether or not investment advice should be used, because the Court of Protection automatically has the funds managed by investment advisers. The Judge said: "Julia Doyle therefore was deprived of any say in whether damages should go to the Court of Protection and deprived of any say in the disposal of her damages under the administration of that Court. She has therefore been put in the position by the negligence of the defendant of incurring dealing charges without any choice whatsoever.". He drew some support from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Wells v Wells, although he did say: "I recognise that it has not resolved the matter and expressly did not wish to do so, but reading the whole of the judgment it does seem to me that certainly the decision in Anderson v Davies was not criticised, and was to a certain extent supported in the Court of Appeal.".

There are 2 points of importance to be noted: first, the Judge is right that some support can be derived from Wells to support a claim for the cost of investment advice and, secondly, it may be appropriate to emphasise the inevitability of incurring these charges in Court of Protection cases. I must add that, personally, I have always found the case of Francis to be entirely unacceptable: the reasoning seems to me to be faulty, and I doubt very much whether that point, if fully argued, would be decided the same today. Having said that, I have to acknowledge that it has been followed by Otton J in either one or two cases.

Incidentally, a very minor point which had to be resolved by the Judge was that the costs of travelling to specialists for medico-legal reports was properly claimable, and this seems to have been supported in some way by the practice of taxing masters.

The major figures are as follows:

Pain, suffering & loss of amenity	£90,000
Past lost of earnings	£38,521
Past care	£69,540
Total Past losses	£128,652
Future loss of earnings	£171,615
Future care	£616,753
Banstead Hall	£83,304
Future cost of Mrs Welsh	£168,636
Pension	£16,000
Accommodation	£28,500
Total Award	£1,341,987

In relation to multipliers, the Judge said: "These arguments (sic) have been based by looking at the Ogden Tables and then by building in discounts which are those at present allowed in law....". It looks as though he used the Ogden Tables and the contingency discount for earnings in the preface to the tables, rather than adopting the unscientific and illogical approach canvassed in Wells, Thomas and Page. Multipliers of 16 for work and 20 for life were used.

BILL BRAITHWAITE Q.C.

****